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Abstract
In the Anglo-American constitutional tradition, judicial checks and balances are often seen
as crucial guarantees of freedom.  Hayek (1960) distinguishes two ways in which the judiciary
provides such checks and balances: judicial independence and constitutional review.  We create a
new data base of constitutional rules in 71 countries that reflect these provisions.  We find strong
support for the proposition that both judicial independence and constitutional review are associated
with greater freedom.  Consistent with theory, judicial independence accounts for some of the
positive effect of common law legal origin on measures of economic freedom.   The results point
to significant benefits of the Anglo-American system of government for freedom.
2 Recent research in political economy clearly recognizes the importance of checks and balances
(Persson and Tabellini 2000, Laffont 2000).  This research focuses entirely on the division of powers
between the executive and the legislature, and pays scarcely any attention to the role of courts.  
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1. Introduction.
Over the centuries, societies have acquired institutions designed to guarantee the freedom
of their members, defined as the absence of coercion by the government (Hayek 1960).  Central
among these institutions is checks and balances, defined by Encyclopedia Britannica (2003) as the
principle of government under which separate branches are empowered to prevent actions by other
branches and are induced to share power.  The importance of checks and balances was recognized
by the early commentators on the English government (Locke 1690, Montesquieu 1748), and later
influenced the American constitutional thinking (Madison, Hamilton, and Jay 1788). 
 A special role in the Anglo-American thinking on checks and balances is played by the
courts (Madison, Hamilton, and Jay 1788, Hayek 1960, Buchanan 1974).2  Hayek (1960)
distinguishes two ways in which the judiciary can limit the power of other branches.  First, the
creation of laws and the administration of justice can be separated. Legislature makes laws, but
independent judges enforce them, without interference from the legislature or the executive.
Second, law- and  policy-making  can itself be subject to review by courts for their compliance with
the constitution. 
Countries build the mechanisms of judicial independence and constitutional review  into their
constitutions.  Some, such as the United States, assure both judicial independence and extensive
constitutional review; other countries, such as Vietnam, allow for neither.  In this paper, we
assemble a new data set of constitutional provisions for judicial independence and constitutional
review for 71 countries around the world. We then ask the basic question: are they associated with
3 Landes and Posner (1975) have a different take on judicial independence.  In their view,
judicial independence prevents legislatures from undermining the laws passed by the previous
legislatures through direct power over judges, and thereby raises the ex ante price that legislators
can extract from the interest groups buying legislation.  It is a commitment device.  We also note
that judges are not intrinsically more supportive of private property than the executive or the
legislator, but are merely more insulated from immediate political pressures when they are
independent.  Along these lines, Besley and  Payne (2003), looking across U.S. states, find that the
elected judges pursue more populist policies than the appointed ones in the area of employment
discrimination.    
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economic and political freedom?  We measure economic freedom as security of property rights, the
lightness of government regulation, and the modesty of state ownership.  We measure political
freedom as democracy, political, and human rights.
Theoretically, judicial independence and constitutional review work in different ways.  When
the executive does not control judges, they are not as partial to his wishes.  According to Alexander
Hamilton, “nothing can contribute so much to [the judiciary’s] firmness and independence as
permanency in office” (Federalist Papers, No. 78).  Judicial independence is of obvious value for
securing property and political rights when the government is itself a litigant, as in the takings of
property by the state.  But judicial independence is also socially valuable in purely private disputes
when one of the litigants is politically connected, and the executive wants the court to favor its ally.
In principle, judicial independence promotes both economic and political freedom, the former by
resisting the state’s attempts to take property, the latter by resisting its attempts to suppress dissent.3
In the 17th century England, opposition to the courts of royal prerogative, controlled by the king and
used by him both to expropriate the property of his opponents and to stop political criticism through
libel laws, was the crucial source of support for judicial independence.   
Besides seeking to influence judges, the executive and the legislature would also wish to
pursue policies and pass laws that benefit themselves, or democratic majorities, or allied interest
3groups.  Constitutional review is intended to limit these powers.  By checking laws against a rigid
constitution, a court – particularly a Supreme or a Constitutional Court – can limit such self-serving
efforts.  In effect, courts rather than legislators become final arbiters of what is law.  Because
constitutional review is used to counter the tyranny of the majority, it may be of particular benefit
in securing political and human rights, as well as preserving democracy. For example, while the U.S.
Supreme Court has long accepted the government’s power to tax and regulate various activities, it
has been more active in protecting political rights.  
Historically, judicial independence and constitutional review evolved in very different ways.
Dawson (1960) and Hayek (1960) trace judicial independence through the English history, including
the reliance on trials by jury starting in the 12th century, the Magna Carta in the 13th, and the 17th
century revolutionary fight against the courts of royal prerogative.  The 1701 Act of Settlement
granted judges lifetime appointments as well as independence from Parliament.   The mechanisms
of judicial independence were transplanted by England as part of the common law tradition into its
colonies, including the United States.  Civil law countries have not adopted this idea in nearly as
consistent a way, and in fact judges have remained in most instances subordinate to the executive.
Glaeser and Shleifer (2002) present a theoretical model that explains why judicial
independence (along with jury trials), is the defining characteristic of common law.   They argue that
any legal system faces a basic tradeoff between vulnerability of law enforcers to either private
subversion through bribery and intimidation or public subversion through executive control.
Centralization of the legal system, including subordination of the judges to the king, protects them
from private subversion, but makes them vulnerable to state influence.  Decentralization, including
judicial independence, isolates the judges from the immediate wishes of the king, but renders them
more vulnerable to private influence.  The authors argue that, in the 12th and 13th centuries, England
4was a more peaceful and less divided country than France, and therefore it was efficient for England
to adopt a less centralized system of law enforcement, which became the common law.  France,
being less peaceful, eschewed judicial independence.
In contrast to judicial independence, the idea of limiting the law-making power of Parliament
is foreign to the English constitution (Dicey 1885).   Hayek (1960) traces this idea to the 18th century
United States, and in particular to the creation of the Supreme Court, which, following the Marbury
vs. Madison decision, came to check both the laws and the executive acts against a difficult-to-
amend U.S. Constitution.  Following the U.S. example, constitutional review gained some popularity
in post-colonial Latin America, and was widely adopted in Western Europe after World War II
specifically as a mechanism to secure political freedom against the risks of communism and fascism
(Friedrich 1968).  The channels of transplantation of constitutional review are thus also relatively
old, but very different from those of transplantation of common law. 
We assemble measures of judicial independence and constitutional review around the world,
and assess empirically their influence on economic and political freedom.   Our measures of judicial
checks and balances come from national constitutions, which are significantly influenced by
transplantation and do not change rapidly.  In contrast, our measures of freedom are the more rapidly
changing “outcomes,” such as subjective assessments of freedom and patterns of government
regulation.  As a consequence, we think of the constitutional rules as pre-determined with respect
to the freedoms.  We also consider the subset of countries whose constitutions have not changed for
20 years prior to the time of measurement.    
Consistent with the hypotheses of Hayek and others, we find that both judicial independence
and constitutional review are strong predictors of  freedom.  We find that judicial independence is
important for both kinds of freedom, whereas constitutional review matters for political freedom.
4 Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, and Levine (2003) ask whether the measures of checks and balances
we have collected account for the beneficial effects of common law on financial development, and
find some empirical support for that idea. 
5Of course, there are other potential channels, including trial by jury, and more generally greater
reliance on court-enforced private contracting in the common law countries (Djankov et al. 2003).
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The different channels of transplantation also enable us to examine the mirco-foundations
of the empirically observed role of legal origin as a predictor of a broad range of economic and
regulatory outcomes.  Recent research shows that, compared to civil law and socialist law countries,
common law countries exhibit better protection of investor rights (La Porta et al. 1997, 1998), less
aggressive regulation of new entry and labor markets (Djankov et al. 2002, Botero et al 2003), and
more generally higher scores on a variety of measures of security of property rights (La Porta et al.
1999).  Quantitatively, these differences among legal origins are large.  Legal origin has proved to
be a particularly useful variable for economic analysis, because laws have been transplanted by
relatively few colonial powers, leading to systematic variation in the legal rules. Yet despite this
evidence, the exact mechanism through which legal origin matters has remained uncertain.  
 Consistent with both history and theory,  judicial independence is empirically strongly
associated with common law legal origin, and is itself a strong predictor of some of the same
economic freedoms as the common law.  This allows us to dig deeper into the micro-foundations
of legal origin and to ask whether its influence on economic freedoms is in part through judicial
independence.4   If the transplantation of common law brings with it independent judges, and if such
judges succeed in stopping excessive political intervention into the economy, then judicial
independence may be one channel of common law’s beneficial effects on the security of property
rights.5  In our data, judicial independence accounts for some, though not all,  of the beneficial
effects of legal origin on economic freedom. 
6 The correlations among the measures of freedom within the same category are high.  In the
economic freedom category, countries that score high on property rights tend to require few
procedures to start a business (-0.57 correlation), regulate employment lightly (-.39 correlation), and
have low government ownership of banks (-.66 correlation).   In the political freedom category,
countries that score high on the index of political rights also score high on democracy (0.91
correlation) and high on human rights (0.90 correlation).  Similarly, countries that score low on
democracy tend to score low on human rights (0.82 correlation).
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2. Data.
Our analysis is based on a sample of all 71 countries covered in the Maddex (1995)
Encyclopedia of Constitutions, with the exception of transition economies (whose constitutions are
rapidly changing).   We do not expand country coverage to assure the compatibility of our coding
with Maddex, but do supplement his data  with information from actual constitutions. Table 1
summarizes the definitions and sources for all variables in the paper.
We use four measures of economic freedom.  The first is a subjective index of the security
of property rights against infringement by the government.  The second is the number of different
steps that a start-up business has to comply with in order to begin operating as a legal entity
(Djankov et al. 2002).  The third measure is the intensity of regulation of the employment contracts
(Botero et al. 2003).  The fourth is an estimate of government ownership of commercial banks as
of 1995 (La Porta et al. 2002).  The last three measures have the advantage of being objective rather
than survey-based estimates of freedom from political interference in markets.  
We use three measures of political freedom, all of which are subjective assessments, but
come from different data sources.  They include a democracy score, an index of political rights, and
an index of human rights.6
    Economic and political freedom are highly positively correlated.  A few countries such as
Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and Singapore score high on economic but low on political freedom.  Other
7 Constitutional rules, like other laws, are enforced better in some countries than in others.
However, recent research points to the importance of actual legal rules in many contexts (La Porta
et al. 1998, Djankov et al. 2002, Botero et al. 2003).  Moreover, since law enforcement is strongly
correlated with per capita income, by controlling for income we also indirectly control for the
differences in enforcement.  
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countries, like Haiti, score low on the former and high on the latter.  But such countries are an
exception, as economic and political freedom typically go hand-in-hand.  Countries that score high
on property rights also score high on democracy (correlation is 0.60), political rights (0.68
correlation), and human rights (0.71 correlation).  Similarly, countries that require a large number
of procedures to setup a new business score low in democracy (-0.25 correlation), political rights
(-0.33 correlation),  and human rights (-0.42 correlation).  Political freedoms are less  highly
correlated with employment laws, and very negatively correlated with government ownership of
banks. 
We relate freedom to two sets of its potential determinants: judicial independence and
constitutional review.  We collect de jure variables derived from national constitutions.7  These
variables reflect the relatively permanent features of a country’s institutional environment, as
compared to political outcomes such as the turnover of politicians, for example.  By collecting these
data, we also provide a new source of information for the comparative study of institutions. 
We collect three proxies for judicial independence, and then combine them into an index.
In  some countries, judges have life-long tenure whereas in others they are appointed for a short
period of time or even serve at the pleasure of the president.  When judges have life-long tenure,
they are both less susceptible to direct political pressure and less likely to have been selected by the
government currently in office.  Because judicial independence is particularly important for disputes
between the citizens and the state (in freedom of speech cases, contracts, etc.), we focus on the
8 Even in countries where judges are not supposed to make law de jure, they make it de facto
(Merryman 1969, Glendon et al. 1982, Damaska 1986).  Even these scholars, however, see the
difference between countries in which precedents are binding, and countries in which only the codes
are supposed to be the source of law. 
9Excluding judicial lawmaking from the index of judicial independence reduces the statistical
significance of the results in some specifications, but does not change the pattern of coefficients on
the judicial independence variable. 
10 Alexander Hamilton writes (Federalist Papers, no. 78): "The complete independence of the
courts of justice is peculiarly essential in a limited constitution. By a limited constitution, I
understand one, which contains certain specified exceptions to the legislative authority; such, for
instance, as that it shall pass no bills of attainder, no ex post facto laws, and the like. Limitations of
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tenure of two sets of judges: those in the highest ordinary courts, and those in administrative courts.
In addition to judicial tenure, we look at case law as the third dimension of judicial
independence.  Because the binding power of the precedent checks the ability of the sovereign to
influence judges in specific instances, it too serves as a useful measure of judicial independence.8
In some countries courts merely interpret laws.  In others, courts have “lawmaking” powers and
judicial decisions are constrained by prior judicial decisions.  Based on David (1973), we keep track
of whether judicial decisions in a country are a source of law. 
Our measure of judicial independence is the average of our measures of tenure of supreme
court judges, tenure of administrative court judges, and judicial decisions as a source of law,
normalized to lie between zero and one.9 
 We collect data on two aspects of constitutional review. First, in some countries the
legislature derives its power and authority from the constitution and is bound by it when making
laws.  In other countries, there is no hierarchy of laws to restrain the legislature either because there
is no constitution or because the legislature can alter it in the same way as it writes new laws.  Thus,
a rigid constitution  -- one that is difficult to modify –  may constrain the power of the legislature.
Second, judicial review may constrain the power of the legislature to make laws.10  In  some
this kind can be preserved in practice no other way than through the medium of the courts of justice;
whose duty it must be to declare all acts contrary to the manifest tenor of the constitution void.
Without this, all the reservations of particular rights or privileges would amount to nothing.”
11 With respect to the index of constitutional review, we have also considered alternative
definitions.  First, judicial review may only matter if the constitution is rigid, and hence a proper
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countries, the constitutionality of laws cannot be challenged.   In others, laws are reviewed by
ordinary courts (including the Supreme court, as in the US) or by specialized constitutional courts
outside of the judicial system (as in many continental European countries). Importantly, countries
also differ in the scope of such review.  In some countries, such the U.S., Germany, Japan, and
Brazil, the institutions established to decide on the constitutionality of laws and actions enjoy the
right of full review.  The Japanese constitution, for example, stipulates that the Supreme Court is
the court of last resort, with power to determine the constitutionality of any law, order, regulation,
or official act.  In other countries, the review of constitutionality is limited in the sense that it is only
available to certain persons or entities, or is restricted to certain aspects of the constitution.  In
France, the Constitutional Council rules on the constitutionality of laws before they are promulgated,
but only the president, premier, the presidents of the two legislative houses, or sixty members of
either house can make a request for a review.  Once the law has been enacted, the Constitutional
Council has no power to nullify it.  Finally, countries such as China, Finland, Iran, North Korea, or
the U.K. have no review at all.  In North Korea, the absence of the power of judicial review by the
courts is the consequence of the concentration of all power in the leadership of the communist party,
whereas in the U.K., the lack of review derives from the absolute supremacy of Parliament.
Our measure of judicial review captures the extent of such review.  The index of
constitutional review is the average of our measures of the rigidity of the constitution and judicial
review, normalized to lie between zero and one.11     
index is the product of judicial review and the rigidity of the constitution. Second, constitutional
review may be ineffective unless courts are independent, and hence a proper index is the product
of judicial independence and constitutional review.  Empirically, we have tried these alternative
approaches, and describe the results in Section 5 below.   
12The correlation between the log of per capita income and judicial independence is .12, that
between the log of per capita income and constitutional review is -.01.
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Following our earlier research, we also use data on the origin of a country’s commercial
laws.  These include common law (England and its colonies), French civil law (France, countries
conquered by Napoleon, and their colonies), German civil law (Germany, Switzerland, Austria,
Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan), socialist law countries (Cuba, China, Vietnam, and North Korea),
and Scandinavian law countries. 
 The correlations among our measures of judicial independence, constitutional review, and
legal origin are presented in Table 2.  The three measures of judicial independence are highly
correlated with each other, as are the two measures of constitutional review.  The two indices,
however, have a statistically insignificant correlation of only .22 (although the correlation between
judicial independence and judicial review is a statistically significant .31).  The data also show that
judicial independence, but not constitutional review, is particularly high in common law countries.
Both measures of checks and balances are low in socialist countries.   We also find no evidence that
either judicial independence or constitutional review is higher in richer countries.12  These data show
that the two kinds of checks and balances do indeed reflect different aspects of the data, and are not
just raw measures of institutional goodness.  
 3. Results.
In this section, we examine the constitutional determinants of economic and political
13In the data, the effects of checks and balances on freedom are actually stronger in the poorer
countries, inconsistent with the view that only the quality of enforcement matters.  
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freedom.  In presenting the results, we 1) always use each of the seven measures of freedom
summarized above, 2) use the indices of judicial independence and constitutional review, and 3) first
present the results with no controls, and then those with additional controls for the possible
determinants of freedom.  We use three controls.   Following our earlier work (La Porta et al. 1999),
we include both latitude and ethnolinguistic fractionalization.  We include latitude because
temperate zones have healthier climates, which might have contributed both to better institutions and
better outcomes (Engerman and Sokoloff 1997). We include ethnolinguistic fractionalization
because both the available evidence (Easterly and Levine 1997) and theory (Alesina et al. 1999)
suggest that ruling groups in ethnically heterogeneous societies  expropriate (or kill) ethnic losers,
restrict their freedom of opposition, and limit the production of public goods.  Both institutions and
freedom may suffer when ethnic heterogeneity is high.   The third control variable we use is the
logarithm of capita income.   Many potential determinants of freedom (including the enforcement
of constitutions)  may be associated with economic development.13  On the other hand, income per
capita is uncorrelated with our constitutional variables.
In presenting the results, we do not include the coefficients on the control variables. While
results vary among regressions, we generally find that both economic and political freedom are
higher in richer countries, and in countries further away from the equator.  Perhaps more
surprisingly, the coefficient on ethnolinguistic fractionalization is insignificant in most regressions.
The results on judicial independence are presented in Table 3.  With no controls, more
judicial independence is associated with statistically significantly greater political and economic
freedom on every measure. Reducing judicial independence from 1 (the United States)  to 0
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(Vietnam)  reduces the property rights index by 2.19 (roughly to Mexico or Nepal, and halfway
toward Vietnam), raises the number of procedures on new entry by 8.06 (roughly to Italy or South
Korea, and two thirds of the way toward Vietnam), raises employment regulation by .80 (roughly
to Belgium or Turkey, and almost all the way to Vietnam), and raises government ownership of
banks by 42 percentage points (roughly to Norway or Ecuador, and compared to 99 percent for
Vietnam).    The same move from the U.S. to Vietnam levels of independence reduces the
democracy score by 3.71 (roughly to Thailand or Nicaragua, and 40 percent toward Vietnam), the
political rights index by 2.2 (roughly to Venezuela and Pakistan, and a third of the way toward
Vietnam), and the human rights index by 22.5 (roughly to Jordan or Nepal, and a third of the way
toward Vietnam). Quantitatively, these are very large effects. 
Adding the controls to these regressions shrinks parameter estimates by roughly 20 percent,
and reduces to 10% the statistical significance of the effect of judicial independence on political and
human rights.  The other effects remain highly statistically significant.  The effects of judicial
independence on economic and political freedom are statistically significant, quantitatively large,
and important above and beyond the effects of economic development. 
The results on constitutional review are presented in table 4.   Without controls, the effects
of constitutional review on economic freedom are usually positive, but not statistically significant.
In contrast, the effects on political freedom are positive and statistically significant. Reducing
constitutional review from the U.S. to Vietnam levels (from .83 to .17) reduces the democracy score,
political rights, and human rights all by about a third of the way toward Vietnam -- again a very
large effect.  When we add the controls, the effect of constitutional review on the property rights
index becomes statistically significant, but that on the other measures of economic freedom remains
insignificant.  In contrast, the effect of constitutional review on the measures of political freedom
13
becomes slightly larger in magnitude and more statistically significant.  If anything, these data
suggest that constitutional review is a guarantee of political but not of  economic freedom. 
Table 5 presents a horse race between judicial independence and constitutional review as
determinants of economic and political freedom.   The effects of judicial independence on economic
freedom remain large and statistically significant, with and without controls, even after
constitutional review is added to the regression (the only exception is the regression for political
rights with controls).  Constitutional review, in contrast, is significant and quantitatively large only
in the political freedom regressions that include controls. 
The basic story that emerges from this evidence is that checks and balances coming from the
judiciary are an important determinant of political and economic freedom.  The “English” institution
of judicial independence appears to be particularly important for economic freedom, but less
consistently so for political freedom.  The “American” institution of constitutional review does not
appear to be clearly important for economic freedom, but is especially important for political
freedom.  These results on the comparative advantage of judicial independence and constitutional
review should not detract from the basic message, namely that judicial checks and balances are
important guarantees of freedom, even holding economic development and other factors constant.
4. Legal Origins.
In Table 6,  we present the regressions of our seven measures of freedom on legal origins,
with and without our controls.  The omitted category is the French legal origin.  The results in the
table are striking, especially for economic freedom.  Compared to the French legal origin countries,
common law countries have sharply higher levels of economic freedom, with and without controls,
for virtually every measure of freedom.   The magnitude of these effects is comparable to that of
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judicial independence (except they are smaller for the property rights index).  The results also show
that socialist legal origin countries have lower security of property rights and higher  government
ownership of banks than do the French legal origin countries, but are similar on the regulatory
indicators of economic freedom.  German legal origin countries also have significantly higher levels
of economic freedom than do French legal origin countries, although this result is partly driven by
differences in wealth, and becomes less pronounced with controls.  Finally, with controls,
Scandinavian countries regulate less than do the French legal origin countries, but are not more
economically free on other indicators.   
In contrast, the differences in the three measures of political freedom between the common
law and French legal origin countries are insignificant.  However, the levels of political freedom are
sharply lower (relative to everyone else) in socialist countries.  Compared to the French legal origin
countries, German and Scandinavian legal origin countries are more politically free, although these
differences generally become insignificant with controls.  The bottom line (except for the socialist
effects) is that the big difference is one in economic freedom between the common law and the
French civil law countries. 
This evidence raises an obvious question in light of the findings of Tables 2-5, namely to
what extent is the legal origin effect on economic freedom the result of the greater judicial
independence in the common law countries.  Is judicial independence in fact the channel of the
beneficial influence of the common law on property rights, regulation, and government ownership?
This question is addressed in Table 7.
The results are mixed.  For the property rights index, we have the dramatic result that judicial
independence wipes out the difference between the English and the French legal origin countries,
suggesting that independent judges are the guarantors of economic freedom.   For our regulatory
14The effect of judicial independence even controlling for legal origin becomes stronger, and
statistically significant in more specifications, with additional continent controls (see Section 5).
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measures, legal origin continues to exert a highly statistically significant effect on economic
freedom, while the effect of independence has “the right sign,” but is at best marginally significant.
Neither legal origin nor judicial independence matter for government ownership of banks.14  For
political freedom, our measures generally do not account for the variation among countries when
all are included in the regression together. 
Comparing the results in Tables 6 and 7, at least some of the effect of legal origin on
economic freedom is explained by judicial independence.  This is strikingly so for the property
rights index, but even for the other measures of freedom, the estimated effect of the legal origin falls
by about a quarter when judicial independence is included in the regression.  Consistent with the
theory of Glaeser and Shleifer (2002),  judicial independence is an important, though not necessarily
the sole, channel of beneficial influence of common law on economic freedom.  
5. Robustness.  
There are a number of empirical issues that require elaboration.  The first concerns the
measurement of checks and balances.  The precise construction of the judicial independence variable
is immaterial, since its three ingredients are highly positively correlated with each other.  On the
other hand, there is a conceptual question concerning our construction of constitutional review,
which in our analysis is the average of constitutional rigidity and judicial review.  First, one can
plausibly argue that constitutional review only matters if both the constitution is rigid  and judicial
review is available.  To address this, we construct a measure of constitutional review which is a
product of constitutional rigidity and judicial review.  The results are very similar to those we
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present in the paper – this change does not matter.   Second, one can argue that constitutional review
only matters when courts are independent, and hence the theoretically correct measure of
constitutional review is the product of our measure and judicial independence (or independence of
the Supreme Court).   As an empirical matter, making this change should make it harder to isolate
the effects of the two types of checks and balances, since they now have common ingredients.
Nonetheless, even with this change, judicial independence remains a particularly good determinant
of economic freedom, while the revised constitutional review is more important for political
freedom.  
A crucial statistical issue for our analysis is reverse causality.  After all, some countries
occasionally change their constitutions in response to political circumstances that may themselves
be captured by our measures of freedom.  We have already raised two points bearing on reverse
causality.  First, by focusing on constitutions, we are looking at legal rules that change less
frequently than do the government regulations or subjective estimates of freedom, and hence are
more likely to be pre-determined.  Second, and more deeply, both history and the evidence we
present suggest that judicial independence is to a significant extent a feature of colonial
transplantation,  and as such is likely to be causal.  To follow this logic, we repeat our analysis for
the 43 countries in the sample that are former colonies.  All our results survive and if anything
become stronger.  As one further way to address reverse causality, we repeat the analysis using a
sample of 44 countries that have not changed their constitutions since 1980.  For these countries, it
may be realistic to treat constitutions as pre-determined if not exogenous.  All of our basic results
survive.  These findings alleviate the concern about reverse causality.
A related objection is that both freedom and constitutional rules are determined by omitted
factors, giving rise to spurious correlations.  We note that we control for geography, ethno-linguistic
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fractionalization, and per capita income in our regressions, which should at least partially deal with
this problem.   In addition, we have rerun all the regressions adding 7 continental dummy controls
(keeping North and South America separate) to our set of standard controls.   Interestingly, the
results for judicial independence become generally stronger with continent controls,  and in fact
exert a statistically significant influence on the property rights index, the number of procedures, and
government ownership of banks even in the regressions controlling for legal origin.  On the other
hand, the results for constitutional review lose statistical significance in the horse race regressions.
6. Conclusion.
In this paper, we examine two distinct types of constitutional checks and balances on the
power of the parliament and the executive provided by the judiciary: judicial independence and
constitutional review.  Using data from 71 countries, we construct empirical measures of judicial
independence and constitutional review, and examine their impact on economic and political
freedom across countries.   
  The data show that both judicial independence and constitutional review are predictors of
freedom.   Judicial independence matters most for economic freedom, and constitutional review for
political freedom. 
We then go on to analyze the pervasive influence of legal origin on economic freedom
around the world, and ask whether judicial independence can provide the micro-foundations of this
influence.  For one key measure of economic freedom, judicial independence wipes out the legal
origin effect; for others, it merely reduces its size.  We take this evidence to suggest that, consistent
with theory,  judicial independence is an important source of economic freedom, which explains
part of the persistent finding of greater such freedom in the common law countries.
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At the broadest level, our results provide strong empirical support for ideas going back to
Locke, the Federalist papers, and Hayek, and enthusiastically revived in recent popular writings
(Ferguson 2003, Zakaria 2003), which see the Anglo-American institutions of checks and balances
as important guarantees of freedom.   In this respect, our paper goes further than our previous work,
which stressed the importance of legal origin for the nature of law enforcement and social control
of business (see Djankov et al. 2003).  The present paper shows that some of the central features of
government, features that have profound consequences for human freedom and welfare, have
common constitutional roots.  
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Table 1: Description of the variables 
 
This table describes the variables collected for the 71 countries included in our study. 
 
 
1.  Dependent variables: 
 
Property rights index: 
A rating of property rights in each country in 1997 (on a scale from 1 to 5).  The more protection private 
property receives, the higher the score.  The score is based, broadly, on the degree of legal protection of private 
property, the extent to which the government protects and enforces laws that protect private property, the 
probability that the government will expropriate private property, and the country's legal protection of private 
property.  Source: Holmes et al. (1997). 
 
Number of procedures: 
This variable measures the number of different steps that a start-up has to comply with in order to obtain a 
legal status, i.e. to start operating as a legal entity.  The number of procedures ranges in the sample from 2 to 
19.  Source: Djankov et al. (2002). 
 
Employment laws index: 
This index measures the level of worker protection through labor and employment laws.  The employment 
laws index ranges from 0.77 to 2.31. Source: Botero et al. (2003). 
 
Government ownership of banks in 1995: 
Share of the assets of the top 10 banks in a given country owned by the government of that country in 1995.  
Ranges from 0 to 1. Source: La Porta et al. (2002). 
 
Democracy index: 
 Democracy score for the year 1994, except for Liberia where the latest available year (1989) was used. Ranges 
from 0 to 10, with lower values indicating a less democratic environment.  Source: Gurr and Jaggers (1996). 
 
Political rights index: 
Index of political rights in 1996 (on a scale from 1 to 7).  Higher ratings indicate countries that come closer to 
the ideals suggested by the checklist questions of: (1) free and fair elections; (2) those elected rule; (3) there 
are competitive parties or other competitive political groupings; (4) the opposition has an important role and 
power; and (5) the entities have self-determination or an extremely high degree of autonomy.  Source: 
Freedom House (1996).  
 
Human rights index: 
A measure of 37 criteria based on the rights enumerated in the three major UN treaties: 1948 Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, 1996 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, International 
Covenant on Economics, Social, and Cultural Rights. Ranges from 17 to 99 in the sample, with higher scores 
indicating better human rights. Source: Humana (1992). 
 
 
2.  Independent Variables: 
    
Tenure of Supreme Court judges: 
This variable measures the tenure of Supreme Court judges (highest court in any country). The variable takes 
three possible values: 2 - if tenure is lifelong, 1 - if tenure is more than six years but not lifelong, 0 - if tenure is 
less than six years. Source: collected mainly from the constitutions of countries as well as secondary sources. 
 
Tenure of administrative court judges: 
This variable measures the tenure of the highest ranked judges ruling on administrative cases. The variable 
takes three possible values: 2 - if tenure is lifelong, 1 - if tenure is more than six years but not lifelong, 0 - if 




 This variable is a dummy taking value 1 if judicial decisions in a given country are a source of law, 0 
otherwise. Source: David (1973).  
 
Judicial independence: 
Judicial independence is computed as the normalized sum of: (i) the tenure of Supreme Court judges (ii) the 
tenure of administrative Court judges (iii) the case law variable. Source: Authors’ calculations based on 
sources mentioned above. 
 
Rigidity of constitution: 
This variable measures (on a scale from 1 to 4) how hard it is to change the constitution in a given country. 
One point each is given if the approval of the majority of the legislature, the chief of state and a referendum is 
necessary in order to change the constitution. An additional point is given for each of the following: if a 
supermajority in the legislature (more than 66% of votes) is needed, if both houses of the legislature have to 
approve, if the legislature has to approve the amendment in two consecutive legislative terms or if the approval 
of a majority of state legislature is required.  Source: Maddex (1995). 
 
Judicial review:        
This variable measures the extent to which judges (either Supreme Court or constitutional court) have the 
power to review the constitutionality of laws in a given country. The variable takes three values: 2- if there is 
full review of constitutionality of laws, 1 - if there is limited review of constitutionality of, 0 - if there is no 
review of  constitutionality of laws. Source: Maddex (1995).  
 
Constitutional review: 
 Constitutional review is computed as the normalized sum of: (i) the judiciary review index (ii) the rigidity of 
the constitution index. Source: Authors’ calculations based on sources mentioned above. 
 
Legal origin  (LO): 
Identifies the legal origin of the Company Law or Commercial Code of each country.  There are five possible 
origins: (1) English Common Law; (2) French Commercial Code; (3) German Commercial Code; (4) 
Scandinavian Commercial Code; and (5) Socialist/Communist laws.  Source: La Porta et al. (1998), extended 
using Reynolds and Flores (1989); and Central Intelligence Agency (1996). 
 
Ethnolinguistic fractionalization: 
Average value of five different indices of ethnolinguistic fractionalization.  Its value ranges from 0 to 1. The 
five component indices are:  (1) index of ethnolinguistic fractionalization in 1960, which measures the 
probability that two randomly selected people from a given country will not belong to the same ethnolinguistic 
group (the index is based on the number and size of population groups as distinguished by their ethnic and 
linguistic status); (2) and (3) probability of two randomly selected individuals speaking different languages; (4) 
percent of the population not speaking the official language; and (5) percent of the population not speaking the 
most widely used language.  Sources: Easterly and Levine (1997). 
 
Latitude: 
The absolute value of the latitude of the country, scaled to take values between 0 and 1.  Source: Central 
Intelligence Agency (1996).  
 
Ln GDP per capita: 
Logarithm of gross domestic product per capita in US dollars for 1998. Ranges from 4.5 to 10.5 in the sample. 
Source: United Nations (2000). 
Table 2: Correlations of independent variables
Correlations of independent variables for the sample of 71 countries around the world. All variables are defined in Table 1.
          CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW               LEGAL ORIGIN
Supreme Administrative Case law Judicial Rigidity of Judicial Constitutional English French
Court tenure court tenure independence Constitution review review legal origin legal origin
Supreme Court tenure 1
Administrative court tenure 0.8325* 1
Case law 0.3554* 0.3778* 1
Judicial independence 0.8247* 0.8447* 0.7828* 1
Rigidity of Constitution 0.0313 0.0975 -0.0786 -0.007 1
Judicial review 0.3356* 0.3447* 0.1887 0.3121* 0.2920* 1
Constitutional review 0.2620* 0.3028* 0.0967 0.2242 0.7217* 0.8727* 1
English legal origin 0.3544* 0.3987* 0.5217* 0.5349* -0.0608 0.096 0.2198 1
French legal origin -0.0657 -0.1871 -0.5927* -0.4298* 0.0224 -0.0106 -0.2766* -0.6451* 1
Socialist legal origin -0.6345* -0.5371* -0.2580* -0.5102* -0.1358 -0.3962* -0.3560* -0.1691 -0.2277
Note: * Significant at 5%
JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE
TABLE 3:  JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE
PANEL A: NO CONTROLS 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Property Rights Index Number of Procedures Employment Laws Index Government Banks Democracy Index Political Rights Index Human Rights Index
independence 2.190*** -8.061*** -0.799*** -0.417*** 3.714** 2.215*** 22.473**
(0.370) (1.881) (0.191) (0.119) (1.403) (0.763) (9.464)
Constant 2.022*** 15.339*** 2.112*** 0.708*** 3.321*** 3.070*** 50.822***
(0.308) (1.566) (0.169) (0.097) (1.108) (0.587) (7.801)
Observations 66 54 54 60 69 68 63
R-squared 0.31 0.28 0.25 0.17 0.08 0.10 0.09
PANEL B: WITH CONTROLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Property Rights Index Number of Procedures Employment Laws Index Government Banks Democracy Index Political Rights Index Human Rights Index
independence 1.879*** -5.965** -0.606*** -0.285** 3.808** 1.642* 19.839*
(0.399) (2.528) (0.217) (0.117) (1.504) (0.839) (10.421)
Constant -1.554*** 25.520*** 2.669*** 1.673*** -2.319 -1.986 -6.374
(0.538) (3.276) (0.429) (0.255) (2.873) (1.383) (15.038)
Observations 66 54 54 60 69 68 63
R-squared 0.73 0.50 0.33 0.38 0.40 0.48 0.50
Note: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
The table presents the results of OLS regressions. The dependent variables are four proxies for economic freedom: (1) Property rights index; (2) Number of procedures; 
(3) Employment laws index; and (4) Government ownership of banks; and three proxies for political freedom: (5) Democracy index; (6) Political rights index; and (7) 
Human rights index.  In Panel A the independent variable is an index of judicial independence. In Panel B the independent variables are: (1) Index of judicial 
independence; (2) Ethnolinguistic fractionalization; (3) Latitude; and (4) Ln GDP per capita. All variables are defined in Table 1.  Robust standard errors are shown in 
parentheses.
TABLE 4 : CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW
PANEL A: NO CONTROLS 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Property Rights Index Number of Procedures Employment Laws Index Government Banks Democracy Index Political Rights Index Human Rights Index
constitutional 1.410* 3.009 0.088 -0.218 4.106** 2.420** 30.864**
(0.718) (2.267) (0.189) (0.173) (2.007) (1.176) (13.173)
Constant 2.776*** 7.078*** 1.418*** 0.527*** 3.611*** 3.252*** 49.249***
(0.480) (1.423) (0.117) (0.112) (1.288) (0.767) (8.867)
Observations 68 54 54 61 71 70 65
R-squared 0.09 0.03 0.00 0.04 0.07 0.09 0.12
PANEL B: WITH CONTROLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Property Rights Index Number of Procedures Employment Laws Index Government Banks Democracy Index Political Rights Index Human Rights Index
constitutional 1.312** 2.228 0.007 -0.177 4.436*** 2.537*** 32.606***
(0.536) (1.408) (0.164) (0.154) (1.518) (0.822) (9.429)
Constant -2.559*** 25.174*** 2.754*** 1.773*** -5.919** -3.860*** -30.056*
(0.565) (3.430) (0.432) (0.251) (2.749) (1.358) (15.421)
Observations 68 54 54 61 71 70 65
R-squared 0.61 0.42 0.23 0.32 0.41 0.52 0.56
Note: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
The table presents the results of OLS regressions. The dependent variables are four proxies for economic freedom: (1) Property rights index; (2) Number of 
procedures; (3) Employment laws index; and (4) Government ownership of banks; and three proxies for political freedom: (5) Democracy index; (6) Political rights 
index; and (7) Human rights index.  In Panel A the independent variable is an index of constitutional review. In Panel B the independent variables are: (1) Index of 
constitutional review; (2) Ethnolinguistic fractionalization; (3) Latitude; and (4) Ln GDP per capita. All variables are defined in Table 1. Robust standard errors are 
shown in parentheses.
TABLE 5: JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE AND CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW
PANEL A: NO CONTROLS 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Property Rights Index Number of Procedures Employment Laws Index Government Banks Democracy Index Political Rights Index Human Rights Index
independence 2.102*** -8.319*** -0.810*** -0.404*** 3.253** 1.950** 18.881**
(0.357) (1.739) (0.181) (0.117) (1.446) (0.770) (8.632)
constitutional 0.514 3.709** 0.156 -0.079 2.438 1.411 19.848
(0.499) (1.631) (0.174) (0.141) (2.012) (1.166) (12.744)
Constant 1.794*** 13.337*** 2.027*** 0.744*** 2.255* 2.453*** 42.317***
(0.365) (1.767) (0.186) (0.116) (1.260) (0.719) (8.958)
Observations 66 54 54 60 69 68 63
R-squared 0.32 0.32 0.26 0.17 0.10 0.13 0.14
PANEL B: WITH CONTROLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Property Rights Index Number of Procedures Employment Laws Index Government Banks Democracy Index Political Rights Index Human Rights Index
independence 1.738*** -6.413*** -0.619*** -0.274** 3.070** 1.178 14.113*
(0.355) (2.383) (0.215) (0.117) (1.524) (0.784) (8.316)
constitutional 0.609* 3.028** 0.084 -0.056 2.951* 1.863** 24.286**
(0.325) (1.199) (0.170) (0.139) (1.594) (0.878) (9.447)
Constant -1.897*** 23.793*** 2.621*** 1.699*** -3.997 -3.050** -19.111
(0.559) (3.316) (0.443) (0.251) (2.870) (1.466) (15.854)
Observations 66 54 54 60 69 68 63
R-squared 0.74 0.53 0.33 0.38 0.43 0.52 0.57
Note: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
The table presents the results of OLS regressions. The dependent variables are four proxies for economic freedom: (1) Property rights index; (2) Number of procedures; 
(3) Employment laws index; and (4) Government ownership of banks; and three proxies for political freedom: (5) Democracy index; (6) Political rights index; and (7) 
Human rights index.  In Panel A the independent variables are: (1) Index of judicial independence; and (2) Index of constitutional review. In Panel B the independent 
variables are: (1) Index of judicial independence; (2) Index of constitutional review; (3) Ethnolinguistic fractionalization; (4) Latitude; and (5) Ln GDP per capita. All variables
are defined in Table 1. Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses.
TABLE 6: LEGAL ORIGIN 
PANEL A: NO CONTROLS 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Property Rights Index Number of Procedures Employment Laws Index Government Banks Democracy Index Political Rights Index Human Rights Index
legal origin - british 0.729** -5.249*** -0.663*** -0.180* 0.095 0.140 -0.843
(0.302) (1.038) (0.092) (0.096) (1.145) (0.597) (6.181)
legal origin - socialist -1.892*** 1.435 -0.101 0.542*** -5.687*** -3.469*** -40.207***
(0.353) (2.351) (0.109) (0.056) (0.719) (0.370) (4.934)
legal origin - german 1.774*** -2.732*** -0.473*** -0.114 3.646*** 2.331*** 19.793**
(0.211) (1.012) (0.153) (0.120) (0.957) (0.414) (8.109)
legal origin - scandinavian 1.574*** -8.065*** -0.605*** -0.095 4.313*** 2.531*** 31.793***
(0.281) (0.799) (0.195) (0.114) (0.719) (0.370) (4.406)
Constant 3.226*** 11.565*** 1.805*** 0.451*** 5.687*** 4.469*** 66.207***
(0.211) (0.755) (0.070) (0.056) (0.719) (0.370) (4.390)
Observations 66 54 54 60 69 68 63
R-squared 0.39 0.48 0.53 0.19 0.22 0.28 0.31
p-value for joint significance <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01
of the legal origin variables
PANEL B: WITH CONTROLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Property Rights Index Number of Procedures Employment Laws Index Government Banks Democracy Index Political Rights Index Human Rights Index
legal origin - british 0.775*** -5.177*** -0.679*** -0.138 0.926 0.234 2.568
(0.262) (1.141) (0.100) (0.085) (1.160) (0.610) (6.557)
legal origin - socialist -1.321*** -0.724 -0.134 0.262** -5.283*** -2.783*** -32.302***
(0.422) (1.895) (0.143) (0.110) (1.020) (0.546) (6.162)
legal origin - german 0.831*** -0.640 -0.385** 0.053 1.558* 0.749* 4.501
(0.254) (1.059) (0.155) (0.133) (0.903) (0.411) (7.390)
legal origin - scandinavian 0.459 -4.863*** -0.419* 0.032 0.657 0.180 10.656
(0.337) (1.113) (0.217) (0.136) (1.059) (0.559) (6.618)
Constant -0.427 21.365*** 2.044*** 1.538*** 0.974 -0.375 15.635
(0.726) (3.330) (0.402) (0.311) (2.980) (1.416) (14.534)
Observations 66 54 54 60 69 68 63
R-squared 0.68 0.64 0.57 0.38 0.41 0.50 0.53
p-value for joint sign. <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 0.03 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01
of the legal origin variables
Note: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
The table presents the results of OLS regressions. The dependent variables are four proxies for economic freedom: (1) Property rights index; (2) Number of procedures; (3) 
Employment laws index; and (4) Government ownership of banks; and three proxies for political freedom: (5) Democracy index; (6) Political rights index; and (7) Human 
rights index.  In Panel A the independent variables are a set of legal origin dummy variables. In Panel B the independent variables are: (1) a set of legal origin dummy 
variables; (2) Ethnolinguistic fractionalization; (3) Latitude; and (4) Ln GDP per capita. French legal origin is the ommitted category. All variables are defined in Table 1. 
Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses.
TABLE 7: JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE, CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW AND LEGAL ORIGIN 
PANEL A: NO CONTROLS 
Property Rights Index Number of Procedures Employment Laws Index Government Banks Democracy Index Political Rights Index Human Rights Index
independence 1.616*** -2.779 -0.375 -0.243 1.962 1.119 8.698
(0.560) (2.623) (0.232) (0.166) (2.232) (1.171) (12.794)
constitutional 0.107 3.304** 0.034 -0.040 1.016 0.546 12.057
(0.500) (1.251) (0.132) (0.155) (2.099) (1.204) (13.902)
legal origin - british 0.094 -4.294*** -0.554*** -0.091 -0.649 -0.285 -3.997
(0.361) (1.172) (0.099) (0.105) (1.418) (0.761) (7.458)
legal origin - socialist -0.893 1.022 -0.346 0.377** -4.079** -2.565*** -29.954**
(0.566) (3.204) (0.233) (0.145) (1.656) (0.875) (11.971)
legal origin - german 1.531*** -2.727*** -0.444** -0.068 3.192*** 2.123*** 17.237*
(0.218) (0.850) (0.169) (0.129) (1.082) (0.466) (8.855)
legal origin - scandinavian 0.906*** -7.007*** -0.489** 0.003 3.468*** 2.052*** 28.576***
(0.330) (1.128) (0.203) (0.125) (1.139) (0.616) (6.698)
Constant 2.209*** 11.427*** 2.044*** 0.622*** 3.910** 3.474*** 53.944***
(0.540) (2.364) (0.228) (0.159) (1.832) (0.992) (13.387)
Observations 66 54 54 60 69 68 63
R-squared 0.46 0.53 0.55 0.21 0.24 0.29 0.33
p-value for joint significance <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 0.10 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01
of the legal origin variables
PANEL B: WITH CONTROLS
Property Rights Index Number of Procedures Employment Laws Index Government Banks Democracy Index Political Rights Index Human Rights Index
independence 1.592*** -4.443 -0.458* -0.228 2.380 0.933 8.843
(0.536) (3.053) (0.228) (0.170) (2.168) (1.147) (12.183)
constitutional 0.547 1.850* -0.045 -0.087 2.386 1.539 21.002*
(0.355) (1.008) (0.142) (0.145) (1.727) (0.974) (11.130)
legal origin - british 0.206 -4.192*** -0.578*** -0.063 0.094 -0.101 -0.551
(0.292) (1.223) (0.099) (0.092) (1.190) (0.637) (5.929)
legal origin - socialist -0.181 -2.824 -0.476* 0.090 -2.829 -1.539 -17.497
(0.588) (3.235) (0.248) (0.161) (1.724) (0.976) (12.624)
legal origin - german 0.532** -0.484 -0.337* 0.105 0.729 0.331 -0.691
(0.248) (0.962) (0.176) (0.142) (1.035) (0.429) (8.422)
legal origin - scandinavian -0.200 -3.711*** -0.285 0.134 -0.715 -0.476 5.023
(0.328) (1.346) (0.230) (0.149) (1.295) (0.669) (7.778)
Constant -1.603* 22.343*** 2.380*** 1.717*** -2.165 -2.144 -6.794
(0.811) (4.248) (0.452) (0.330) (3.462) (1.791) (21.341)
Observations 66 54 54 60 69 68 63
R-squared 0.76 0.69 0.60 0.41 0.45 0.54 0.58
p-value for joint significance 0.07 <0.01 <0.01 0.61 0.24 0.13 0.59
of the legal origin variables
Note: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
The table presents the results of OLS regressions. The dependent variables are four proxies for economic freedom: (1) Property rights index; (2) Number of procedures; 
(3) Employment laws index; and (4) Government ownership of banks; and three proxies for political freedom: (5) Democracy index; (6) Political rights index; and (7) 
Human rights index.  In Panel A the independent variables are: (1) Index of judicial independence; (2) Index of constitutional review;and (3) a set of legal origin dummy 
variables. In Panel B the independent variables are: (1) Index of judicial independence; (2) Index of constitutional review; (3) a set of legal origin dummy variables; (4) 
Ethnolinguistic fractionalization; (5) Latitude; and (6) Ln GDP per capita. French legal origin is the ommitted category. All variables are defined in Table 1. Robust standard 
errors are shown in parentheses.
Appendix A: Dependent variables by country 
 
Country Property Rights Index Number of Procedures Employment Laws Index Government Banks Democracy Index Political Rights Index Human Rights Index
Algeria 3 . . 1.00 0 2 66
Argentina 4 13 1.58 0.61 8 6 84
Australia 5 2 0.89 0.12 10 7 91
Austria 5 8 0.77 0.50 10 7 95
Bangladesh 2 . . 0.95 9 5 59
Belgium 5 7 1.74 0.28 10 7 96
Brazil 3 11 2.31 0.32 10 6 69
Canada 5 2 1.19 0.00 10 7 94
Chile 5 10 1.46 0.20 9 6 80
China 2 10 1.59 0.99 0 1 21
Colombia 3 17 2.02 0.54 9 4 60
Cuba 1 . . . 0 1 30
Denmark 5 3 0.90 0.09 10 7 98
Ecuador . 16 1.75 0.41 9 6 83
Egypt 3 11 1.81 0.89 0 2 50
Ethiopia 2 . . . 2 4 .
Finland 5 3 1.75 0.31 10 7 99
France 4 15 1.47 0.17 8 7 94
Germany 5 8 1.76 0.36 10 7 98
Ghana 3 10 1.14 . 1 4 53
Greece 4 15 1.82 0.78 10 7 87
Haiti 1 . . . 8 3 .
Honduras 3 . . 0.30 6 5 65
Iceland 5 . . 0.71 10 7 .
India 3 11 1.19 0.85 8 4 54
Indonesia 3 11 1.68 0.43 0 1 34
Iran 1 . . 1.00 0 2 22
Iraq 1 . . 0.94 0 1 17
Ireland 5 3 1.07 0.04 10 7 94
Israel 4 5 1.29 0.65 9 7 76
Italy 4 11 1.36 0.36 10 7 90
Japan 5 11 1.27 0.00 10 7 82
Jordan 4 12 1.49 0.26 4 4 65
Kenya 3 9 1.26 0.30 0 1 46
Kuwait 5 . . 0.33 0 3 33
Lebanon 3 9 1.14 0.07 2 2 .
Liberia . . . . 0 1 .
Libya 1 . . 0.95 0 1 24
DEPENDENT VARIABLES
Appendix A: Dependent variables by country 
Country Property Rights Index Number of Procedures Employment Laws Index Government Banks Democracy Index Political Rights Index Human Rights Index
Malaysia 4 7 0.90 0.10 8 4 61
Mexico 3 15 1.91 0.36 1 4 64
Mozambique 2 19 2.25 . 6 5 53
Nepal 3 . . . 8 5 69
Netherlands 5 6 1.69 0.09 10 7 98
New Zealand 5 3 1.03 0.00 10 7 98
Nicaragua 2 . . 0.63 6 4 75
Nigeria 3 9 1.32 0.10 0 1 49
North Korea 1 . . . 0 1 20
Norway 5 4 1.26 0.44 10 7 97
Pakistan 4 8 1.06 0.86 8 5 42
Panama 3 7 2.28 0.17 8 6 81
Peru 3 6 1.74 0.26 2 3 54
Philippines 4 9 1.63 0.27 8 6 72
Portugal 4 10 2.29 0.26 10 7 92
Saudi Arabia 5 . . 0.29 0 1 29
Singapore 5 6 0.85 0.14 2 3 60
South Africa 3 9 1.05 0.00 8 7 50
South Korea 5 11 1.27 0.25 10 6 59
Spain 4 10 2.10 0.02 9 7 87
Sweden 4 4 0.90 0.23 10 7 98
Switzerland 5 7 1.28 0.13 10 7 96
Syria 2 . . 1.00 0 1 30
Taiwan . 8 1.65 0.77 6 . .
Thailand 5 8 1.72 0.17 6 5 62
Turkey 4 12 1.74 0.56 9 3 44
Uganda 4 11 1.74 . 0 3 46
United Kingdom 5 4 1.02 0.00 10 7 93
USA 5 3 0.94 0.00 10 7 90
Venezuela 3 14 2.26 0.58 8 5 75
Vietnam 1 16 1.82 0.99 0 1 27
Zambia 3 5 1.17 . 6 5 57
Zimbabwe 3 5 0.89 0.30 0 3 65
Average 3.56 8.87 1.47 0.40 5.93 4.61 66.18
DEPENDENT VARIABLES (CONTINUED)
Appendix B: Independent variables by country 
Country Supreme Administrative     Case law Judicial Judicial Rigidity of Constitutional
Court tenure court tenure Independence Review Constitution Review
Algeria 0 0 0 0.00 1 4 0.75
Argentina 2 2 1 1.00 2 2 0.67
Australia 2 2 1 1.00 2 3 0.83
Austria 2 2 0 0.67 2 2 0.67
Bangladesh 2 2 1 1.00 2 2 0.67
Belgium 2 2 0 0.67 1 3 0.58
Brazil 2 2 0 0.67 2 2 0.67
Canada 2 2 1 1.00 1 3 0.58
Chile 2 2 0 0.67 1 3 0.58
China 0 0 0 0.00 0 2 0.17
Colombia 1 1 0 0.33 2 2 0.67
Cuba 0 0 0 0.00 0 2 0.17
Denmark 2 2 1 1.00 2 3 0.83
Ecuador 2 2 1 1.00 2 3 0.83
Egypt 2 2 0 0.67 2 3 0.83
Ethiopia 2 2 0 0.67 1 3 0.58
Finland 2 2 1 1.00 0 2 0.17
France 2 0 0 0.33 1 3 0.58
Germany 2 2 1 1.00 2 3 0.83
Ghana 2 2 1 1.00 2 2 0.67
Greece 2 2 0 0.67 2 2 0.67
Haiti 1 1 0 0.33 1 4 0.75
Honduras 0 0 1 0.33 1 3 0.58
Iceland 2 2 1 1.00 2 4 1.00
India 2 2 1 1.00 2 3 0.83
Indonesia 2 2 1 1.00 0 2 0.17
Iran 2 0 0 0.33 0 1 0.00
Iraq 0 0 0 0.00 0 1 0.00
Ireland 2 2 1 1.00 2 3 0.83
Israel 2 2 1 1.00 0 1 0.00
Italy 2 2 0 0.67 2 2 0.67
Japan 1 1 1 0.67 2 4 1.00
Jordan 2 2 1 1.00 1 3 0.58
Kenya 2 2 1 1.00 2 1 0.50
Kuwait 2 2 0 0.67 1 3 0.58
Lebanon 2 2 0 0.67 1 3 0.58
Liberia 2 2 1 1.00 2 3 0.83
Libya . . . . 0 1 0.00
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES
Appendix B: Independent variables by country 
Country Supreme Administrative     Case law Judicial Judicial Rigidity of Constitutional
Court tenure court tenure Independence Review Constitution Review
Malaysia 2 2 1 1.00 1 2 0.42
Mexico 1 1 0 0.33 2 3 0.83
Mozambique 2 2 0 0.67 2 2 0.67
Nepal 2 2 1 1.00 2 3 0.83
Netherlands 2 2 0 0.67 0 4 0.50
New Zealand 2 2 1 1.00 0 1 0.00
Nicaragua 1 1 0 0.33 1 2 0.42
Nigeria 2 2 1 1.00 2 4 1.00
North Korea 0 0 . . 0 2 0.17
Norway 2 2 1 1.00 2 3 0.83
Pakistan 2 2 1 1.00 1 4 0.75
Panama 1 1 0 0.33 2 2 0.67
Peru 2 2 1 1.00 2 2 0.67
Philippines 2 2 1 1.00 2 2 0.67
Portugal 2 0 1 0.67 2 2 0.67
Saudi Arabia 2 2 1 1.00 0 1 0.00
Singapore 2 2 1 1.00 2 2 0.67
South Africa 2 2 1 1.00 2 2 0.67
South Korea 1 1 1 0.67 2 3 0.83
Spain 2 2 0 0.67 1 3 0.58
Sweden 2 2 1 1.00 1 2 0.42
Switzerland 1 1 1 0.67 0 2 0.17
Syria 2 2 0 0.67 1 3 0.58
Taiwan 2 2 1 1.00 2 2 0.67
Thailand 2 2 0 0.67 1 4 0.75
Turkey 2 2 1 1.00 1 2 0.42
Uganda 2 2 1 1.00 2 2 0.67
United Kingdom 2 2 1 1.00 0 1 0.00
USA 2 2 1 1.00 2 3 0.83
Venezuela 1 1 0 0.33 2 2 0.67
Vietnam 0 0 0 0.00 0 2 0.17
Zambia 2 2 1 1.00 1 2 0.42
Zimbabwe 2 2 1 1.00 1 3 0.58
Average 1.67 1.59 0.59 0.75 1.28 2.46 0.56
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES (CONTINUED)
